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2
1 Introduction
The concept of microﬁnance, to provide low scale ﬁnancial services to low
income people, is much older than generally known. This is an important fact
since it shows how informal ﬁnancial services in developed countries evolved
to a commercial and private banking sector. It helps to understand what
kind of consequences microﬁnance movements can have on the economical
development processes in developing countries.
At the beginning, non-proﬁt and charitable lenders dominated the mi-
croﬁnance sector. Their objective was to reach as many poor people with
low scale ﬁnancial services as possible. However, over the years new lend-
ing techniques, such as individual and joint liability contracts, evolved and
created a new market which is now partially proﬁt-making. Particularly
the Grameen Bank and its group lending contract have received extensive
academic attention in recent years.
The ﬁrst part of this thesis compares the diﬀerent contractual features
of microﬁnance with a special focus on Grameen Bank. Subsequently, the
focus will be put on how these lending possibilities help the poor to improve
their social standards. Especially the improvement of women's situation is
discussed. In addition the thesis takes a closer look at possible extensions to
microcredit contracts, which would help to improve the quality of ﬁnancial
services.
Having found a way to serve low income people with small microﬁnance
loans, new problems come up. On the one hand the ﬁnancial market has
to deal with market failure, namely that of asymmetric information. In the
case of developing countries this problem becomes more severe since ﬁnancial
institutions have to deal with lack of information and data about potential
borrowers. On the other hand, microﬁnance institutions (MFIs) are not able
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to handle the tremendous demand for low scale ﬁnancial services, which in the
end leads to credit rationing. These problems will be anlayzed more closely
in the second part of the thesis. Furthermore, the reasons MFIs have to
charge interest rates which are frequently higher than those of bank interest
rates will be given.
It is very interesting to study how the theoretical models of microﬁnance
are used in diﬀerent developing countries. In this thesis microﬁnance tech-
niques are investigated using the example of Uganda. By means of looking
at the Ugandan ﬁnancial sector, the most frequently applied lending meth-
odes will be analyzed as well as MFIs ability to meet the total demand for
ﬁnancial services of the rural population. In conclusion Ugandan's interest
rate situtation charged by MFIs will be dealt with.
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2 Background of Microﬁnance
2.1 The Development of Microﬁnance
2.1.1 The Beginnings of Microﬁnance in Europa
Microﬁnance is not a recent development since today's developed countries
can look back on a long history of microﬁnance. The beginning of microﬁ-
nance in Europe dates back to the 16th and 17th century. At that point in
time poverty increased extraordinarily. As a reaction in a number of Euro-
pean countries a microﬁnance sector started to evolve as a type of banking
for the poor. Almost right from the start, microﬁnance was seen as a ﬁnacial
intermediation between microsavings and microcredit. Furthermore, due to
legal recognition, prudential regulation and mandatory supervision microﬁ-
nance experienced a process of mainstreaming during the 20th century. As a
result of this develpoment microﬁnance became part of the formal banking
sector1.
In this context especially Ireland's microﬁnance system is remarkable,
since it prospered in a market where credit services were very diﬃcult to
obtain due to extreme macroeconomic instability and a high emigration rate
throughout the 19th century. Microﬁnance in Ireland covers the period from
1720 to 1950, where a network of non-proﬁt banks oﬀered loans to the poor
without collateral2.
The so-called Irish Loan Funds, which emerged in the 1720s, were a long-
lived, self-sustaining, large-scale microﬁnance organization. It issued millions
of loans to the poor, without making them provide any collateral. At ﬁrst,
those loan funds were intended as charities which were funded by donated re-
1see Seibel, 2005, p.1
2see Hollis/Sweetmanb, 2001, p. 2
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sources, but over time they were replaced by ﬁnancial intermedation between
savers and borrowers.
By the middle of the 19th century loan funds had become one of the most
important ﬁnancial institutions in the country. They covered approximately
20% of all households, far more than commercial banks. Furthermore, the
deposit rates of those funds were three times higher than those of commercial
banks, whereas loan funds charged higher interest rates. Since the loan funds
became a serious threat to commercial banks in 1843, these institutions in-
duced the government to put a ceiling on the interest rate which lead to the
loss of the loan funds' competitive advantage. The end of the story was a
substantial decline of scale until they ﬁnally disappeared in the 1950s3.
2.1.2 Current Situation of Microﬁnance in Developed Countries
Political development in several countries created an environment in which
small microﬁnance beginnings evolved into huge networks of local ﬁnancial
institutions which are now part of the formal banking system. Nonetheless,
the problem that poor households are excluded from the mainstream formal
credit market up to now, could not have been completely solved in developed
countries. Therefore, how do poor households deal with borrowing barriers
in developed countries nowadays?
For example, in the United States an extensive set of credit markets for
the poor operates apart from the mainstream credit markets. It is about the
so-called "fringe banking", which consists of pawnshops, payday loan ﬁrms
and cheque-cashing ﬁrms. "Fringe banking" is of great importance, since the
Unites States provide a weak social safety net.
The clients of fringe banking come from a variety of socio-economic back-
3see Seibel, 2005, p.2
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grounds but all of them are of low income. They have limited access to
formal credit markets because of bad credit histories or the fact that they
have reached the limit of their borrowing capacity already. Fringe ﬁnancial
services issue short-term ﬁnancing to people in need because of job loss, un-
expected expenses, income shortfalls and other personal problems. Thus,
fringe banking generally represents the ultimate borrowing possibility to low
income people in order to keep themselves liquid.
In the last decade important changes have occurred in the modality of
small-scale lending to poor households. According to Caskey, a major shift
away from lending by pawnshops to so-called payday lending could be ob-
served. One reason is that payday lenders are willing to make larger loans
to poor households - their loans average about $ 250 versus about $75 for
pawnshops - than pawnbrokers. In addition, payday lending is considered to
be more practical since the borrower does not have to provide a security in
the form of a personal possession to the lender.
Payday lending refers to very short term loans taken out by workers who
run out of cash before payday. The borrower writes a personal check made
out to the lender and in exchange the payday lender receives a cash payment.
Before the loan matures, the borrower can pay back the face value of the
check in cash and the debt is cleared. If the borrower can not repay, the
lender will deposit the check. The opinions about payday lending as a useful
service to low-income individuals diﬀer. Critics argue that payday lenders
provide extremely expensive short-term loans to people who have no better
alternatives. Furthermore, they state that many lenders do not use payday
loans once but in fact take out such loans frequently.
Another fringe banking service, that low income people rely on, are so-
called "check cashing outlets" (CCOs). Most charge a check-cashing fee that
7
is a percentage of the face value of the check. Many clients of CCOs are
less well educated than those who use banks and are not provided with bank
accounts. In recent years many CCOs started to oﬀer payday loans.
In conclusion, it can be said that the strong growth in payday lending
proves that many low-income people are willing to accept higher interest
rates. The reason for that phenomenon can be found in their desire to be
supplied with short-term loans whenever they need them. In the future,
electronic payment trends are expected to further change the shape of payday
lending, pawnbroking and commercial check cashing4.
2.2 Contractual Features of Microﬁnance
The modern microﬁnance movement began as an economic development tool
in the 1970s. It rapidly gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s since a
rethink, concerning the image of the poor, has taken place. In former times
poor people were mostly seen as unproductive individuals who could only
be helped through donor ﬁnanced programs and subsidies, but microﬁnance
disproved this assumption. It appeared that the poor can become active and
viable actors in the economy, when endowed with appropriate surrounding
conditions. Over the years microcredit programs advanced from being an
experimental alternative to a serious model for lending to the poor5.
Until recently large groups of society in poor and developing countries
were excluded from the credit market. They did not have any access to ﬁ-
nancial services such as bank saving accounts, credit facilities or insurances.
It was almost impossible for them to apply for micro loans, which they nec-
essarily needed, for improving their self-employment opportunities. As a
4see Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p. 18
5see Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p. 199
8
consequence, self-employment became impossible to realize or if they had
already started their businesses they suﬀered from underﬁnancing and were
not able to expand their businesses.
The reasons for exclusion were multifarious. One reason stems from the
fact, that lending institutions typically have limited information on the qual-
ity and behaviour of their clients, particularly of those with small informal
businesses6. Furthermore resource-poor enterpreneurs, who cannot provide
any collateral, are unable to demonstrate their creditworthiness to the banks.
This makes it impossible for banks, who grant loans only by collateral, to as-
sess borrowers risk. Moreover, people who run small scale businesses mostly
ask for small loan sizes. In the formal banking system however it is not pos-
sible to substitute lacking collaterals by additional screening or monitoring
eﬀorts. The reasons are that on the one hand the thereby added costs exceed
the potential revenues and that on the other hand most institutional lenders
of the formal banking sector consider the allocation of micro loans as highly
ineﬃcient7.
However, microﬁnance institutions, also known as MFIs, which oﬀer ﬁ-
nancial services to impoverished people, have shown that informational and
collateral problems of poor people can be overcome by oﬀering special con-
tracts. Loan contracts are a sequence of uncollateralized loans which grow
over time. Through periodical loan repayments, the borrowers obtain access
to further loans but if a borrower defaults he will be excluded. Thus, bor-
rowers repayment incentive is created by their desire to maintain access to
further microﬁnance loans8.
6see Sadoulet/Carpenter, 2001, p. 4
7see Kritikos/Vigenina, 2005, p. 213-214
8see Sadoulet/Carpenter, 2002, p. 4
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2.2.1 Individual Versus Group Loans
Most MFIs apply two types of loan contracts, in order to deliver ﬁnancial
services to their clients: the individual loan contract and the joint-liability
loan contract, which is also known as group contract.
In the individual loan contract borrowers are individually repsonsible for
their loan. However, in the group contract borrowers are jointly reliable for
the loan. The ﬁrst thing a borrower needs to do, before being considered for
a group loan, is to become a member of a group. In the majority of cases,
the credit group must consist out of ﬁve or seven individuals. Then each
group member receives a loan on her own, but all group members are held
jointly liable for the entirety of the group loan. This means that if one group
member get's into ﬁnancial problems, all other group members are considered
in default too and are punished by the lending institution9.
The great majority of MFIs rely on group lending contracts. Especially
Grameen Bank and its group lending contract have received a lot of academic
attention in recent years. A reason for this was the success of the Grameen
Bank in Bangladesh, since it raised hopes that group lending schemes can
be used to provide the rural poor with formal sector credits10. According to
the Grameen Bank homepage, the repayment rate amounts to 97%, which is
higher than other schemes that lend money to the rural poor. In addition,
Grameen Bank's default rate is about 2%, which is lower than the default
rates of commercial banks in Bangladesh. There, commercial banks suﬀer
a default rate of about 70% for agricultural loans and 90% for industrial
loans. According to Muhammad Yunus, the reason for such a big diﬀerence
can be found in the psychology of the borrowers. The rich can aﬀord the
9see Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p. 229
10Chowdhury, 2005, p 416
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consequences of non-repayment, whereby the poor cannot11.
For a better understanding how group lending schemes work, the Grameen
Bank group lending scheme will be examined more closely. Muhammad
Yunus, founder of the Grameen Bank (Bangladesh), realized that poor peo-
ple have the potential to help themselves if given access to the beneﬁts of
eﬃcient ﬁnancial markets. His solution to the lack of ﬁnancial services in
areas of severe rural poverty was the following: First, Grameen Bank hires
agents which travel through the countryside at regular intervals, making
loans and collecting loan repayments. Secondly, only women who belong to
the Grameen's loan circles are eligible for future loans12.
Loans disbursed by the Grameen Bank are small, but suﬃcient for women
to ﬁnance micro-enterprises like rice-husking, machine repairing, purchase of
rickshaws, buying of milk cows, goats, cloth, pottery and much more. Giving
women ownership of assets helps them to reduce their dependency on their
husbands and makes it possible for them to improve their homes and the
nutritional standards of their children. Moreover, Grameen Bank pays at-
tention that the ownership of houses or businesses, which were built through
their loans, remain with the borrowers who are mainly women. Today about
97% of Grameen Bank's borrowers are female.
The Grameen bank lending system is based on the voluntary formation
of small groups of ﬁve people. They help to establish morally binding group
guarantees instead of collateral, which is required by conventional banks. In
other words, social cohesion between group members give rise to norms and
sanctions to prevent borrowers from defaulting. Especially in small villages
with high poverty rates and limited availability of collateral social capital
11see http://www.gdrc.org/icm/grameen-article4.html, availability date: June 16, 2008
12see Article Feiner, 2006
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has become an important factor for the successful implementation of group
lending contracts13.
2.2.2 Grameen Bank Group Lending System
At the Grameen Bank, not all group members are provided with credit at
the same time period. At ﬁrst only two group members are eligible for a
loan and receive it. Subsequently the group is observed for a month, in order
to see whether the members are acting upon the rules of the bank. Not
till the ﬁrst two borrowers begin to repay the principal plus interest over
a period of six weeks, the other members of the group will become eligible
for a loan themselves. Through these restrictions, group pressure is built up
and contributes to keeping individual records clear. In this sense, mutual
responsibility of the group serves as a collateral on the loan.
If serious repayment problems emerge, all group members will be cut
oﬀ from future borrowing. In practice, group members often step in for a
defaulting group member with the intention of collecting the money from
the defaulted member at a later point in time. Such a behaviour is encour-
aged by Grameen's policy of not extending any further credit to a group in
which a member defaults. However when no problems come up, borrowers
are oﬀered a larger loan repayable in the next "loan cycle"14. Thus, if the
relationship between the Grameen Bank and their borrowers persists, loan
sizes will start to grow and credit histories will be built up. Eventually, loans
may be large enough to realize bigger investments like building, repairing a
house or sending a child to university 15.
13see http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/bcycle.html, availability date: March 26, 2008
14Loan cycle = from initial disbursement to repayment of the ﬁnal installment
15see http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html, availability date: March 26, 2008;
Armendàriz, 2005, p.88
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3 Screening Mechansims for Group Lending Pro-
grams
3.1 Assortative Matching
One of the problems, in the context of group lending contracts, is concerned
with adverse selection. Adverse selection describes an incident, when bor-
rowers have personal attributes that are unobservable to the lender but aﬀect
their repayment probability of the loan. MFIs try to overcome the problem
of adverse selection by oﬀering credit terms that only attract safe borrowers.
The common approach for ﬁnancial institutions to separate safe from
risky borrowers is to ask the borrower to pledge collateral. In developing
countries it presents a great problem, since poor borrowers are not in the
position to provide collateral. Thus, MFIs have problems to distinguish safe
from risky borrowers. However, Ghatak (1999, 2000) proposes a solution to
that by showing how MFIs can take advantage of borrowers knowledge about
each other's risk type, that is information which is unobservable to MFIs.
3.1.1 The Model
Let us suppose that there are risk-neutral borrowers which are of two types,
safe (s) and risky (r). Both borrowers are endowed with an investment
project. Since borrowers lack suﬃcient collateral each borrower has to take a
loan in order to ﬁnance the project. Each project has a probability of success
pi (i= s, r), where ps > pr. For simplicity, it's assumed that one's project
return does not depend on the other's project return (they are uncorrelated).
A borrower's project can take two values, either income (H), if successful or
zero, if it fails. The borrower takes a loan of one unit of capital and repay
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r > 1. In other words, at the end of the loan time period the borrower has
to pay principal plus interest.
For keeping this model simple, it limits the group size to 2 in which
borrowers form groups voluntarily and take a loan. Under a joint-liability
credit contract, the borrower pays nothing to the lender when his project fails
due to the limited-liability constraint16. However, if the borrower's project
is successful, then beside paying her own debt to the lender, she is obliged to
pay an extra amount c > 0 for the team member whose project failed. The
parameter c simply measures the degree of joint liability.
3.1.2 Group Formation Game
Now the aim is to show, how the group formation game works. It will be
pointed out how the instrument of joint liability can be used to induce self-
selection of groups. In other words, why do joint liability borrowers always
come up with partners of the same risk type? At this, Ghatak talks about
the positive assortative matching in the group formation game.
Under joint-liability lending the risk type of a group member is of less
importance until the partner's project fails. In that case, every borrower
prefers a safe borrower compared to a risky borrower since a safe partner
causes lower expected joint liability payments than a risky partner. However,
just as a borrower herself succeeds she realizes the beneﬁt of having a safe
rather than a risky partner. As a result, a safe borrower's preference to
form a group with another safe borrower is bigger than the risky borrower's
preference to form a group with a safe borrower. The reason is based on
the fact, that the safe borrowers probability of success is higher than that
16The limited-liability constraint implies that the borrower cannot repay more than their
current income.
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of a risky borrower. Therefore, safe borrowers appreciate safe partners more
than risky borrowers, since they repay more often. This implies that safe
borrowers are willing to pay bigger side payments for having a safe partner
than risky borrowers. In summary, if borrowers are allowed to form their
own groups, they will sort them into realtively homogenous groups of "safe"
and "risky" borrowers. In the end this leads to homogenous matching.
In real life there is a possibility, that a risky borrower makes side payments
to a safe borrower in order to make him accept as a partner. However, ac-
cording to the proof of Ghatak, the maximum side payment a risky borrower
is willing to pay, in order to be accepted as a partner of a safe borrower, is
less than the minimum amount a safe borrower will need to be paid in order
to be compensated for having a risky partner17.
3.2 Monitoring
Monitoring is a process of gathering information and imposing punishment.
Through its application to individual or group lending contracts the basic
problem of information asymmetries can be diminished. Monitoring helps to
reveal which project a borrower chooses and in addition penalties are set by
the monitor in case the chosen project is too risky.
Under individual lending, the lender either monitors the borrower directly
and gets to know the identity of the project with some probability or she
delegates the task of monitoring to another agent. Under group lending the
17Side payments are feasible also under the assumption that borrowers have no wealth
that can be used as collateral. However, borrowers within a group can make transfers
to each other in ways that are not possible with an outsider (namely, the bank) like free
labour service.
see Ghatak, 1999, p. 29; Ghatak, 2000, p. 609
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borrowers can monitor each other. By comparing these diverse monitoring
methodes, it will be discovered that lender monitoring is relatively costly
compared to group monitoring, where two borrowers can monitor each other
at a lower cost.
In a monitoring process, with some probability, the monitor detects the
identity of the borrower's project. This means, that the monitor either de-
tects the risk type of the borrower's project or she detects nothing. In the
case monitoring is successful - the monitor observes that the borrower chooses
a risky project - she can impose a form of punishment like to conﬁscate the
realized returns on the project. At this, the expected punishment, which the
borrower may face, can vary because of the levle of uncertainty or the form
of punishment imposed in case of detection. Therefore, the monitor chooses
the certainty equivalent of the expected punishment, that is the probability
of detection times punishment imposed by the monitor in case of detection.
The borrowers who montior each other, know the level of being monitored
and therefore exactly know what kind of punishment they have to await at the
moment they choose the projects. In many cases, the threat of being punished
is an appropriate methode in order to prevent borrowers from selecting risky
projects and in the end the punishment does not need to be realized18.
3.2.1 Problem of Undermonitoring
In group lending, the level of monitoring among two borrowers are strategic
complements. This means that if borrower j monitors, then borrower i has an
incentive to monitor herself. However, if borrower j decides not to monitor
then borrower i is free to invest in the second project and has no incentive
to monitor herself. The consequence will be, that both borrowers choose the
18see Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p. 234
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second project and the lender makes a loss. The problem occuring here can be
denoted as "undermonitoring". Through the involvement of either sequential
ﬁnancing schemes or a combination of joint liability and active monitoring,
the lender may be in position to resolve the problem of undermonitoring. The
latter concept is applied by the Grameen Bank. Through the arrangement
of weekly group meetings at which Grameen Bank employees participate and
train the group members conﬁdence between the villagers and the bank can
be built. In general, the problems can be resolved on the spot.
Now, let us consider how this problem can be resolved by means of a
sequential ﬁnancing concept. Let us assume we have a group of two bor-
rowers, borrower 1 takes on the role of a monitor and borrower 2 represents
a normal borrower, who the bank initially lends 1 dollar. In addition, the
dollar is randomly allocated to one of the two borrowers. In the ﬁrst stage,
the assigned borrower invests the loan in her ﬁrst project. The project fails
and both borrowers end up with a payoﬀ of zero due to the limited liability.
However, when the project succeeds, the roles of the borrowers are reversed.
In that case, the payoﬀ depends on the outcome of the second project. Now,
the project of borrower 2 is ﬁnanced by the lender and borrower 1 takes on
the role of the monitor19.
The outcome of the sequential ﬁnancing concept is easily understandable.
The decisive point is, that if borrower 1 does not monitor and borrower
2 receives the loan, then borrower 2 will invest into the risky project and
borrower 1 will have a payoﬀ of zero. However in the case of monitoring, the
monitor may force borrower 2 to invest in the safe project, so the lender can
be repaid and borrower 1 receives a loan in the second period. This in turn
19see Aniket, 2003, p. 5
17
creates a greater incentive for borrower 2 to monitor herself20.
3.2.2 The Contracting Process
The lender of a micro loan sets up the contractual conditions of individual or
joint liability credit contracts. In this context, the most relevant parameters
consist of the loan size and the payment which the borrower has to make and
which depends on the outcome observable to the lender without monitoring.
Then, the borrowers have to take the decision whether to accept or reject the
contract oﬀer. Thus, when they accept, borrowers start to play the follow-
ing non-cooperative game: In the ﬁrst phase both borrowers simultaneously
commit themselves to levels of expected punishment. In addition, borrowers
begin to observe each other's actions, whereas lenders do not monitor, and
choose projects. In the end returns are realized and payments are made.
In an individual liability contract borrowers do not monitor each other.
It follows that it is incumbent upon the lender to decide on the level of
monitoring. Borrowers choose their projects on the basis of their utility
and independently of the other borrowers' choices. Each borrower will only
choose a safe project if the expected utility by implementing a safe project
is equal or bigger as the expected utility of a risky project.
In the case of joint liability contracts borrowers act as monitors - observe
each other's actions - but lenders do not monitor. Borrowers are free in im-
plementing strategies, ﬁxing the level of monitoring and in choosing projects
which constitute the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium21, also known as
(SPNE), of this game.
On closer examination this game features three possible SPNE:
20see Chowdhury, 2005, p. 418
21Nash euqilibrium can only be constituted through symmetric strategies, because bor-
rowers' actions are strategic complements.
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1. Neither of the borrowers monitor and both choose the risky project
2. Both borrowers monitor and choose the safe project
3. Both monitor and choose the risky project
Let us take a closer look on the ﬁrst subgame in which borrowers un-
dertake projects after they agreed upon not to monitor each other. If one
borrower chooses the risky project, the probability that she will have to pay
the liability declines and in turn the probability of the borrower who chooses
the safe project will rise. The consequence is that the safe borrower ob-
tains the same gain as the risky borrower by chossing the risky project and
additionally experiences a decrease in the probability of having to pay the
liability. Thus, the key feature of that subgame is, if one chooses the risky
project the other one will do as well.
The second possible Nash equilibrium exists in the subgame in which
both borrowers choose the safe project after both borrowers agree to moni-
tor. It is a Nash equilibrium because the borrower who monitors selects an
appropriate level of monitoring, namely the other borrower chooses the safe
project as well. Furthermore, this subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the
pareto dominant one.
The last possible Nash equilibrium concerns the subgame in which both
borrowers monitor and both choose the risky project. At this it is also
about the only Nash equilibrium in each of the subgames after asymmetric
monitoring decisions 22.
22see Madajewicz, 2004, p. 11-12; Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p. 235-239
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4 Microcredit Repayment Insurance
So far micro-ﬁnance institutions (MFI) and programs focused on providing
uncollateralized, inexpensive loans to the poor, to which they maintain access
as long as the borrowers repay. However, in case of default they will be
punished by losing further access to these loans. By and by, MFI practitioners
and promoters realised that providing credit is not enough in order to assure
sustainable development to the people. Therefore, MFIs started to provide
a range of other ﬁnancial services like insurances beside their microcredit
services.
In the past, insurances were never considered as an option for the poor,
since formal insurance services were not aﬀordable by them because of high
insurance premiums. In addition, they were considered to be uninsurable
due to a wide variety of risks like death, illness, injury and natural disasters.
The insurance contract that MFIs propose allow them to provide insur-
ance to the poor whenever they suﬀer from liquidity shocks. The contract
aims to cover borrowers repayment obligations when they ﬁnd themselves
unable to repay. The idea behind, is to reduce the vulnerability of borrow-
ers assets to credit risk by increasing repayment rates to lending institutions
simultaneously. Thus, by adding insurance clauses to credit contracts credit
risk will be transfered back to MFIs. In other words, it is about a sim-
ple credit-with-insurance contract that MFIs implement in environments in
which insurance mechanisms are incomplete.
4.1 Incorporating Insurance in Loan Contracts
Due to the fact that borrowers are vulnerable to repayment risk, MFIs in-
troduce an insurance contract which is tied to the individual loan. The
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insurance contract is based on the main incentive mechanism in microlend-
ing contracts, that of loan repetition. This means that borrowers repay in
order to maintain access to bigger future loans.
The main idea of the contract is to award an insurance conditional on
the basis of the borrowers reputation. Individual borrowers build up a credit
record by means of their loan repayment behaviour. As long as borrowers
past repayment behaviour is good, their insurance claims will be honored and
thus protect them from default. However, borrowers with bad credit records
do not qualify for insurance.
Let's take a closer look on the timing of the loan and insurance contract,
which is illustrated in ﬁgure 1. At the beginning of each loan issuance, bor-
rowers with good credit records receive a loan. If they qualify for insurance,
they will have to take the decision whether to sign up for the insurance con-
tract or not. In the case they subscribe, they will have to pay an insurance
premium. The remaining money - loan minus insurance premium - will be
invested in one of their projects, which can succeed or fail. At the moment,
the borrowers get to know the outcome of their project, they have to make
a repayment decision which will be inﬂuenced by their desire to maintain
access to future loans. If the borrower decides to repay, she remains in good
standing and can receive a loan in the next period. Otherwise the borrower
will be excluded from the business relationship forever. After that process,
the ﬁrst loan cycle ends and the business relationship moves on to the next
period.
Since borrowers do not possess any assets or other sources of income, they
are unable to signal their type of risk, that of being a risky or safe borrower,
by any investment. Thus, MFIs initially do not have any information on any
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Figure 1: Stages of Loan and Insurance Contract
Source: Loïc Sadoulet (2003)
particular borrower and all borrowers start at the same reputation µi23. At
regular intervals, MFIs update the borrowers reputations according to their
repayment observations. Successful repayment of a loan increases borrower
reputation while default leads to a decrease in reputation. Figure 2 gives an
example of a possible evolution of borrower reputation24.
Being able to ﬁnance the insurance MFIs claim an insurance premium.
The premium need to be paid when the loans are issued. MFIs generally
charge a fair premium to each subscriber. Therefore the following pricing
rule can be applied: "the institution cannot charge more than the minimum
23It need to be recorded that MFIs mostly start with some prior distribution of borrower
risk. The initial value of µi can for example be the average of the institutions prior
distribution of types.
24see Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p. 213
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Figure 2: Evolution of Borrower Reputation
Source: Loïc Sadoulet (2003)
premium that would make the insurance contract incentive compatible"25.
Thus the premium for the borrower is mainly dependent on her reputation.
From period to period the premium will be updated as more information
becomes available.
Due to the fact that borrowers must have been succesful in all periods
before they can qualify for insurance for the ﬁrst time, the premium that
borrowers face before signing up for the ﬁrst time decreases by and by and
tends downwards to zero. Thus, the premium will eventually become low
enough that any borrower who values future loans will be able to sign up.
4.2 Two Sources of Abuse
Due to the problem of asymmetric information between lenders and borrow-
ers26, MFIs are faced with to two sorts of abuse. One stems from undesirable
borrowers whose ambition is to sign up for insurance in order to have access
25see Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p. 224
26Lenders have diﬃculties to assess the true riskiness of loans they extend since they
cannot ﬁgure out the risk type of their potential borrowers.
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to more loans before they get excluded from the credit scheme at last. The
other sort of abuse are fraudulent claims.
4.2.1 Excluding Undesirable borrowers
Undesirable borrowers can be described as borrowers who are excessively
risky and default strategically. If they were granted a loan without insur-
ance, they would directly go into default after one period, since the cost of
repaying a loan balances the beneﬁt of maintaining access to future loans.
However, the implementation of an insurance permits these borrowers to de-
fault several times before they are ﬁnally excluded from the program. Thus,
these undesirable borrowers want to sign up for the insurance contract in
order to beneﬁt from a second loan on which they default, as long as the
payable insurance premium is not too large.
A way of avoiding this adverse selection problem is to award insurance
coverage only to borrowers who can show a reputation above a certain thresh-
old. The threshold must be set at a level so that it takes a couple of pre-
liminary rounds of successful loan repayments to reach it. Thereby, MFIs
are given a chance to sort out borrowers who would otherwise strategically
default on the insurance contract. The ocurring waiting period serves as a
deterrent to the riskier borrowers. This means, the longer the waiting period
the fewer the number of undesirable borrowers who will in fact bear up the
waiting period.
The insurance contract must provide some incentive mechanisms that
induce borrowers to claim insurance only when they need it. Therefore the
insurance contract is made up with the following two restrictions:
• No borrower with a reputation below some cutoﬀ is insured;
• There is no insurance in the ﬁrst round loans;
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The aim is to keep undesirable borrowers from participating and in order
to achieve it, MFIs put an entry cost on the insurance contract for screening
out undesirable borrowers. Entry costs can either take the form of suﬃcient
rounds of successful loan repayments or the form of a series of high insurance
premium until the borrower has established a reputation as a willing repayer.
Anyway, not all strategic borrowers can be excluded, since eliminating all
strategic defaulters would take an inﬁnite waiting period.
Nonetheless, in comparison to no-insurance contracts, MFIs can reduce
the cost of adverse selection in the insurance contract. The reason is the
following: If the waiting period is long enough to discourage risky borrowers
from participating, the cost of adverse selection becomes consistent with the
cost in the no-insurance case. This means, that strategic borrowers either
default on the ﬁrst loan or they repay T-1 loans before defaulting on two
loans in a row. Therefore, for a waiting period that is long enough, the losses
in the insurance case will be smaller than in the no-insurance case. That
outcome can be traced back to the fact, that risky borrowers will repay a few
loans before defaulting on two27.
4.2.2 Fraudulent Claims
The gains and losses in reputation for borrowers are greatest in the early
rounds of the loans because there MFIs do not have much information on
borrowers. Each repayment or insurance claim represents a part of the in-
formation which is available to MFIs to assess borrowers. With incremental
loan rounds, the gains and losses in reputation shrink to the point that it
becomes negligible. Thus, the risk of a decline in reputation, as a deterrent
for false insurance claims, diminishes by and by.
27see Loïc Sadoulet, 2003, p. 16
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Figure 3: Evolution of Borrower Reputation µ[T ]
Source: Loïc Sadoulet (2003)
Figure 3 illustrates borrowers' potential reputation as a function of the
numbers of loans repaid. The outer curve describes a borrower's reputation
with no default, the second curve a borrower's reputation with one default
and so on. In other words, any default reduces the reputation of the borrower
and drops the borrower down one curve.
Borrowers who make use of fraudulent claims do not repay the current
loan and the insurance premium. This leads to an increase in the future
insurance premium due to a loss of reputation and to an increase in the
probability of falling below the reputation threshold after repeated failures.
It is notable that after enough loan repetitions these two loss eﬀects become
inﬁnitesimal. Therefore an extra cost, beyond simple loss of reputation, for
claiming insurance must be imposed to discourage borrowers from applying
false claims28.
What form can extra costs take? Let us consider the US-style credit-
card system, in which only customers with stable incomes and credit records
28see Credit Markets for the Poor (2005), p. 218
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without great blemish receive credit cards. If a customer cannot meet his
obligations, the issuing bank either restricts or even stops the customer's
credit card use. However, by and by customers are able to build up a reputa-
tion as good customers by means of responsible use and timely payments. In
return banks are more likely to increase customers credit limits and accept
late payments. However, the occuring cost to the holder is the late payment
fee and a negative entry in the holder's record if the late payments happen
recurrently. A few missed payments are already suﬃcient to cause the MFI
to deny the credit card holder any further credit service. It will take quite a
long time for the credit card holder to make the bank forget the bad credit
record.
Credit-with-insurance contracts cannot in every detail be compared to
US credit-card contracts since credit-card companies issue temporary loans
to borrowers of good standing and they allow late payments. However, some
parallels can be drawn in conjunction with reputation and sanctioning mech-
anisms. The sanctioning mechanisms to prevent moral hazard behaviours are
equivalent to downgrading a borrower's reputation and reducing her acquired
"experience"29.
29see Loïc Sadoulet (2003), p. 19; Credit Markets for the Poor, 2005, p.218
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5 Problems of Microﬁnance
One of the most serious economic problems for low development countries is
that many poor people do not have access to formal credit markets. This ex-
clusion holds back many potential entrepreneurs with viable business plans
from realizing their own potential. The problem arises from the inability
of formal sector banks, including both private and government banks, to
proﬁtably lend money to poor people. In recent years the concept of "micro-
ﬁnance" has succeeded in expanding the availability of credit30.
However, access to credit in low development countries does not neces-
sarily imply that the demand for credit will as well be satisﬁed. It is up
to the lender how much credit to allocate, based on the probability of loan
default. More precisely, the probability of default is inﬂuenced by the ex-
pected returns of the project, the terms of the loan, market imperfections
and borrower characteristics31.
5.1 Asymmetric Information
The problem of asymmetric information, based on the work of George Akerlof
(1970), can also be assigned on the informal credit market. Credit markets
are characterized by information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers,
which signiﬁes that borrowers are better informed about their risk of default
than lenders. Information asymmetries in credit markets arise because gain-
ing information of potential borrowers in such markets is diﬃcult. Normally,
lenders like to know, whether potential borrowers have repaid their debts in
the past, whether they have a reputation as reliable borrowers, whether the
prospective borrowers can be trusted with the money or whether the borrow-
30see Kahlmann/Odeen, 2005, p. 5
31see Okurut/Schoombee/Berg, 2004, p. 7
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ers owe money to anyone else, but in low development credit markets credit
histories of borrowers are not documented.
Acquiring accurate information on the quality of borrowers can either be
obtained by the potential borrower himself or by questioning other people
like close friends and family member of the borrower. If lenders collect in-
formation about potential borrowers in this way, they will run the risk of
getting a truthless view of borrowers creditworthiness or will be confronted
with mistrust and the questioned people will withhold information, if the
person who wants to ﬁnd out such information is a stranger. It is extremely
costly for lenders to obtain reliable information because of long journeys to
faraway villages and multiple interviews with sources of dubious reliability32.
Therefore, if lenders would increase the lending rate to compensate for the
higher cost of information gathering or the level of reliability of the informa-
tion, it may result in adverse selection and moral hazard. In this case it is
about borrowers' behaviour which may negatively aﬀect the lenders' return33.
5.2 Why is there Credit Rationing?
Credit rationing refers to a situation in which the lender refuses to extend
a credit to a borrower at a certain interest rate that was appointed by the
lender to a borrower type. However credit rationing should not be mistaken
for the phenomenon whereby a potential borrower refuses to accept credit
because of too high interest rates. The key feature of credit rationing is that
credit is denied at interest rates which were proposed by the lender himself.
Even if the borrower was willing to pay a higher interest rate as asked, credit
would still be refused by the lender34.
32see Jaﬀer, 1999, p. 8
33see Okurut/Schoombee/Berg, 2004, p. 7
34see Greenbaum, 1995, p.267
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When credit is rationed an unsatisﬁed demand for credit at a certain
interest rate occures. This shows that credit demand exeeds supply at that
interest rate. For economists credit rationing is ridiculous, since prices -
interest rates - shift demand and supply up or down until demand and supply
are equated at the new equilibrium. So if prices do their job, no lasting
rationing should be able to exist.
An explanation why asymmetric information may lead to "credit ra-
tioning" is given in the paper of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Stiglitz and
Weiss show that the interest rate does not fulﬁll the market-clearing func-
tion under certain conditions, which signiﬁes that credit supply and demand
will not always end up in equilibrium. In addition the paper explains, that
in equilibrium a credit market may be characterized by credit rationing. In
conclusion, it will be showed that credit rationing can be an optimal strategy
for lenders to distinguish between good and bad borrowers.
5.2.1 The Model of Stiglitz and Weiss
MFIs, which are issuing loans, are concerned about the interest rate they
receive and the riskiness of the loan. At ﬁrst, a theoretical view will be
taken on the model of Stiglitz and Weiss. As illustrated in ﬁgure 4, credit
interest rates announced by MFIs for a particular borrower type are called
the optimal interest rate r∗. The MFIs probability distribution of returns,
that is the relationship between the interest rate charged and the expected
return to the lender, can be described as a concave function. Therefore the
expected return to the lender starts to increase less rapidly than the interest
rate and beyond a certain point the expected return may start to decrease.
Furthermore both, demand and supply of loans, are functions of the in-
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Figure 4: Due to credit rationing the optimal interest rate is above the
equilibrium interest rate. A special interest rate exists which maximizes the
expected return to the lender.
Source: see Kahlmann/Odeen, 2005, p. 11
terest rate whereas the supply is determined by the expected return at r,35.
If demand exceeds the supply of loans traditional analysis would allow un-
satisﬁed borrowers to pay a higher price - interest rate - in order to reach a
new equilibrium of supply and demand. However, in informal credit markets
that methode cannot be applied since supply does not equal demand at the
optimal interest rate. Lenders would not be willing to lend to a borrower who
oﬀers to pay more than the optimal interest rate because the expected return
to the lender at an interest rate above r∗ is lower than the expected return
to the lender at the optimal interest rate36. Therefore the lender keeps her
35The expected return corresponds to the market clearing rate.
36see Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981, p. 394
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interest rate at some level below the market-clearing level. In other words,
the bank will engage in "credit rationing", whereby it will not raise its in-
terest rates even though some of the borrowers would be willing to pay more
than the optimal interest rate37.
In their paper, Stiglitz and Weiss show that the interest rate can inﬂuence
the credit risk in a way which may attract bad borrowers under certain
circumstances ("adverse selection") and it may induce borrowers to riskier
actions ("moral hazard").
5.2.2 Eﬀect of Adverse-Selection
In an informal credit market two types of information hurdels occure:
1. Lenders cannot distinguish between borrowers who are of diﬀerent risk
levels, even after they have analyzed each borrower's ﬁnancial standard.
2. Lenders cannot totally control borrowers actions and this induces the
borrower to increase the project risk38.
Because of the predominant information gap that exists between lenders
and borrowers, a lender uses the interest rate as a screening device which
sorts good borrowers from bad. The theory indicates that after a certain
point higher interest rates lead to "adverse selection" in the pool of potential
borrowers. This phenomenon occures because lenders try to set adequate
interest rates for borrowers with good credit records, but simultaneously
attracts people with little motivation to repay. As a consequence the bank
raises its interest rates to scare oﬀ "bad" borrowers but ends up losing more
of the "good" borrowers and attracting more risky borrowers with higher
37see Jaﬀer, 1999, p. 12
38see Greenbaum/Thakor, 1995, p.269
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probability of default. "Good" borrowers react more sensitively to interest
rate variations. Thus, the bank is caught in a process where it is impossible
for them to get rid of "bad" borrowers without losing "good" borrowers39.
The eﬀect of assortative matching is best illustrated by an example. Let
us consider two potential borrowers who can either be "safe" or "risky" and
the lender cannot tell who is who. Both borrowers do not have wealth of their
own and so they need to borrow money for carrying out their investment
projects. A project requires $100 of investment and once the loan is given it
needs to be repayed at the end of the year. Let us assume that the "safe"
borrower succeeds in 100% of the cases which implies a return of $110 before
loan repayment. However the "risky" borrower succeeds only in 10% of the
cases and may yield $160 but has a 90% chance of yielding zero return. The
"safe" borrower is willing to pay an interest rate of let us say 9% and his
project yields enough to cover the principal plus interest and still leave a
residual of $1. On the other hand, the "risky" borrower only cares about the
outcome in which the project yields more than the credit amount, because if
the project yields less than the amount the losses fall entirely on the lender
because of the borrower's limited liability. Knowing that the "risky" borrower
is willing to pay a higher interest rate of let's say 59%.
The crucial point here is that the lender is unable to ex ante distinguish
between the diﬀerent types of borrowers. The only thing the lender knows
is that increasing interest rates will become counterproductive at a certain
point according to the model of Stiglitz and Weiss40.
On the one hand, increasing interest rates raise the return of successful
projects but on the other hand they may drive valuable borrowers out of
39http://www.santafe.edu/education/reu/2003/ﬁles/goldberg.pdf, availability date:
June 16, 2008
40see Jaﬀer, 1999, p. 12
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Figure 5: Adverse-selection Eﬀect
Source: Stiglitz/Weiss
the credit market. Figure 5 illustrates, that "safe" borrowers will only lend
money at an interest rate below r1 and "risky" borrowers are willing to borrow
money at relatively high interest rates, below r2. Already a slight increase of
the interest rate above r1 will have a dramatic eﬀect on the pool of potential
borrowers. It can be seen that all "low risk" borrowers do not participate in
the credit market any more41.
5.3 Moral Hazard
Moral Hazard occures after the transaction, that is after the loan has been
disbursed, since lenders do not know how the given money will be invested.
In other words, it refers to situations in which the lender cannot observe
the eﬀort or action undertaken by the borrower or the realization of project
returns42.
An increase in the interest rate may worsen the moral hazard problem
41see Stiglitz/Weiss, 1981, p. 397
42see Armendáriz/Morduch, 2005, p. 43
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since borrowers with low risk projects will be more likely to invest in high
risk projects which leads to a higher default probability. This may mean
a lower proﬁt for the lender at higher interest rates. Thus, lenders realize
that it does not make much sense to increase the loan interest rate since
its expected proﬁt is maximized at the interest rate level at which credit
demand exeeds supply (see ﬁgure 4)43. As a consequence lenders who have
to struggle with information asymmetries and lack control over the actions of
borrowers are forced to design credit contracts that induce borrowers to set
actions that enlarge their repayment probability and also attract more low
risk borrowers. For this reason, lenders may ﬁnd it better to charge lower
interest rates than the optimal interest rate and use other mechanisms than
the interest rate to ration credit44.
Even if a borrower has once accepted a loan at an interest rate level it
can still come to a diﬃculty for the lender. The reason is simple, since if
the interest rate is high the borrower's incentive to cheat on the lender will
increase. If the proﬁt, which the borrower may realize, is not high enough and
if the borrower has no possibility to increase her potential proﬁt by changing
the project she may simply stop exerting eﬀort into the project. The lender
will then lose everthing apart from what she can repossess from the project
since the borrower has limited liability45.
Therefore lenders do not lend at high rates even if the borrowers are
initially willing to accept the interest rates46.
43see Greenbaum/Thakor, 1995, p.270
44see Hoﬀ/Stiglitz, 1990, 238
45see Greenbaum/Thakor, 1995, p. 267
46see Kahlmann/Odeen, 2005, p. 13
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6 Microcredit Interest Rates
6.1 Why are Microﬁnance Interest Rates so High?
The main objective of Microﬁnance Institutions is to ensure that poor people
have permanent access to ﬁnancial services whenever they require it. The
realization of this plan mainly depends on the MFIs' ability to generate
enough income in order to cover all costs. Interest rates charged on micro
loans mark the main income source to MFIs. Therefore MFIs have to charge
interest rates that are high enough to cover all of their costs. Three types of
costs can be associated with the lending process, namely the cost of funds for
on-lending, the cost of risk (loan loss) and all administrative costs (identifying
and screening clients, processing loan applications, disbursing payments and
collecting repayments).
The majority of the administrative process of commercial banks is carried
out by technology. This means that computeraided credit scoring, commu-
nication with clientes and payment processes facilitate the administrative
processing. By contrast, MFIs lack technology and therefore are heavily de-
pendent on personal contact for issuing and recovering loans. This is very
time-consuming and resource intensive. In addition, MFIs have to deal with
poor physical infrastructure, like inadequate road networks, transportation
and telecommunication systems, which contributes to an increase in admin-
strative costs and adds signiﬁcantly to the overall cost of microﬁnance oper-
ations47.
Beside high administrative costs, lending costs are proportionally higher
for micro loans than for commercial bank loans. While a developed commer-
cial institution may lend a large sum of money to one borrower, a microlender
47see Fernando, 2006, p. 3
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will lend a very small sum to many borrowers. The following example, de-
scribed by the CGAP Donor Brief No. 6, clearly illustrates the principle of
the microcredit cost structure:
"Compare the costs of two hypothetical lenders, Big Lender and Mi-
croLender, each of which lends US $1,000,000. Big Lender makes a single
loan, while MicroLender makes 10,000 loans of US $100 each"48.
• "If the actual cost per loan is $25, the percentage cost is 0.25 percent
for a $10,000 loan, but 25 percent for a $100 loan.
• The percentage cost of making microloans is even higher because clients
generally have no credit history, no collateral, are frequently illiterate,
and often live in remote areas. It is expensive to go to these clients'
doorsteps and intensively monitor repayments"49.
Even if the interest rates of microloans are high, they still have a positive
eﬀect on borrowers in low development countries. Since they generally do
not have any access to formal ﬁnancial credit markets, impoverished people
attach great importance to micro loans. Therefore they are willing to pay
higher interest rates.
Even though, the MFIs' interest rates are higher than those of commer-
cial banks they are still below those charged by so-called credit sharks, like
money-lenders or other informal sources50. According to the paper of Mr.
Fernando, the nominal interest rates charged by most MFIs in the Asian and
Paciﬁc region range from 30% to 70% a year. However the eﬀective interest
rates are even higher because of commissions and fees charged by MFIs. By
contrast, a standard moneylender loan in the Philippines, also known as the
48see CGAP Occasional Paper No. 9, 2004,p. 2
49see CGAP Donor Brief No. 6, 2002, p.1
50see http://www.cgap.org/portal/site/cgap/, availability date: April 24, 2008
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"5/6" loan, amounts to a daily interest rate of 20 percent. In other words, for
every ﬁve peso borrowed in the morning, six must be repaid in the evening51
6.2 Subsidization of Interest Rates
In order to make up for the lack of commercial banks in rural or agricultural
areas, governments designed special rural credit programs or institutions.
The main task of these programs was to issue loans to the poor at artiﬁcially
low interest rates which are below the market rates. It was assumed that
subsidised interest rates lower credit costs and increase the supply of credit.
In addition it was argued, that the economic growth and rural development
can be brought forward in low development countries. For example: Accord-
ing to the paper of Mr. Okuma, Uganda's introduced programs included the
Rural Farmers Scheme implemented through the Uganda Commercial Bank
(UCB) during the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Entandikwa Credit Scheme
instituted in 1994 and the current loans extended by Microﬁnance Support
Center Limited. All of these programs targeted for subsidized lending interest
rates.
Over the years a lot of literature examined the outcomes of subsidized
interest rates on ﬁnancial services to the poor. It was found that govern-
mental support of lending programs had a negative eﬀect on the provision of
ﬁnancial services. It was based on cheap funds which lead to an excess in de-
mand and as a consequence made rationing mechanisms on subsidized loans
necessary. Another problem that came up was that borrowers often viewed
these subsidized loans as grants or gifts and this lead to low repayment rates
since borrowers were less likely to repay those loans. Moreover, low interest
rates contributed to the MFIs' inability to cover their operating costs and
51see CGAP No. 6, 2002, p. 1
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thus lead to a dependence on private-donors or governments. This implied
that lending institutions could only survive when provided with permanent
new subsidies.
Knowing all that, it can be said that subsidized programs are only ben-
eﬁcial to a small number of borrowers for a short period of time. If the
governmental support disappears, the MFI will be forced to raise its interest
rates in order to survive. In comparison, MFIs with clients who pay inter-
est rates show that fundig can also be achieved from commercial sources.
The outcome is sustainable growth without being dependent on subsidized
funding sources, which are often unpredictable.
After the examination of all negative eﬀects of subsidies on MFIs it is
time to think about situations in which subsidies are necessary. Especially
during the start-up phase of MFIs subsidies are important. They are used to
cover operating costs, to build MFI systems and staﬀ capacity. The reason is
that it may take several years for MFIs to reach a certain scale which allows
them to cover their costs from interest rate income only. During the set up
phase MFIs are therefore dependent on donors who provide the capital base
needed for optimal growth, the increase in leverage and the ability to serve
a larger number of clients on a sustainable base.
6.3 Interest Rate Ceilings
Many developing countries have imposed interest rate ceilings for protecting
the poor from so-called credit sharks - unscrupulous lenders. However, inter-
est rate ceilings do not help to increase the availability of aﬀordable ﬁnancial
services for the poor52.
Interest rate ceilings have a negative eﬀect on the poor, especially when
52see CGAP Donor Brief No. 18, 2004, p. 1
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they are set too low. Then it is impossible to sustain microﬁnance services
since interest rate ceilings ration people's access to ﬁnancial services. Fur-
thermore, MFIs incur losses since too low interest rates make it impossible
to acquire enough income in order to cover all their operating costs. As a
consequence MFIs are forced to withdraw from the market or to reduce their
services in rural areas. Also the set-up phase for new MFIs will be made
more diﬃcult since potential investors will be discouraged from supporting
the industry. Another important aspect of interest rate ceilings is that they
aﬀect the creditworthiness of MFIs since it limits the MFIs' ability to borrow
from the market for ﬁnancing their operations. Interest rate ceilings also in-
ﬂuence the lending nature of MFIs, which means that more short term loans
than long-term loans will be given. Interest rate ceilings contribute to an
increase in policy risk and an additional expected increase in inﬂation will
lead to an enlargement of the risk in long-term loans. Finally, interest rate
ceilings often create an artiﬁcally high demand for microcredit relative to the
amount supplied, which leads to credit rationg through MFIs53.
In the case of Bangladesh, the government has imposed an interest rate
ceiling for government-run microcredit programmes, which amounts to 11 per
cent at ﬂat rate and about 22 per cent at declining basis. By the example
of the Grameen Bank it can be seen that the interest rate charged on micro
loans, is lower than the government rate. According to the Grameen Bank
homepage, it charges an annual interest rate of 20% (on a declining basis)
for its main credit product namely income generating loans, 8% for housing
loans, 5% for student loans, and 0% (interest-free) loans for Struggling Mem-
bers. In addition, all interest rates charged by the Grameen Bank are simple
interest and calculated on a declining balance method.
53see Fernando, 2006, p. 4
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In his paper, Mr. Fernando states that the interst rate charged by the
Grameen Bank was below their cost recovery levels and in turn lead to losses.
Moreover, their incured losses could only be absorbed by the big subsidies
it received through government and private donors. In addition, Grameen
Bank's interest rates may not be compared with those of other MFIs, since
other MFIs have not received similar amounts of subsidies.
6.4 Competition on Microcredit Markets
Economists have nearly always supported policies that favor competition,
since competition helps to lower equilibrium interest rates for consumers54.
In the formal market sector new ﬁrms will be attracted in as soon as ﬁrms
make excess proﬁts and as a result ﬁrms will reduce the prices of their services.
If no ﬁrms enter the market, threat of entry will act as a deterrent for ﬁrms
from oﬀering higher prices. However, through the lowering of prices ﬁrms
may prevent new ﬁrms from entering the market since their excess proﬁt will
be reduced to a level where their incentive to enter the market disappears.
Competition in credit markets is not limited to pricing since it oﬀers
consumers greater access to providers, a wider choice of appropriate products
and better services55. Knowing that, it could be expected that an increase in
competition between MFIs would lead to greater advantages for the poor56.
However, the eﬀect of competition in microﬁnance markets diﬀers from the
theory as the following paragraphs show.
In formal credit markets proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms compete with each other,
however in microcredit markets the lenders' behaviour is inﬂuenced by non-
governmental organizations (NGO) which do not aim to maximize their prof-
54see McIntosh, 2004, p. 271
55see CGAP Focus Note, 2006, p. 1
56see McIntosh, 2004, p. 272
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its. Furthermore donors and government-controlled wholesale funders have
a great inﬂuence on the competitive behaviour of the microﬁnance sector be-
cause of their controlling function over funds. "For example, when external
funders impose restraints on pricing, microlenders are no longer free to make
fully competitive pricing decisions"57.
McIntosh and Wydick analyzed the eﬀects of competition on microcredit
markets. They designed a model in which a single client-maximizing MFI
competes with an existing informal moneylender. At this they examined the
eﬀects when new MFIs enter the same pool of borrowers. The ﬁrst ﬁnding
was that new entering MFIs reduce the ability of a socially motivated lender
to generate loans that foster lending to the poorest borrowers. The second
ﬁnding was that missing grant funding restrictions to poor borrowers may
lead to a behaviour in which client-maximizing non-proﬁt institutions under-
cut proﬁt-maximizers by capturing the most proﬁtable borrowers in a given
pool. The last negative eﬀect of competition among MFIs is that asymmetric
information between lenders will be increased. The more MFIs there are in a
market, the more complicated it gets to share information between lenders.
Therefore, many borrowers would be tempted to take multiple loans which
in turn would increase average debt levels among borrowers and decrease the
expected equilibrium repayment rate on all loan transactions. In the end all
borrowers would be worse oﬀ58.
6.5 Setting Lending Interest Rates
The appropriate pricing of ﬁnancial services is decisive for the short- and
long-term success of MFIs. Over the years several theories have been put
57see CGAP Focus Note, 2006, p. 3
58see McIntosh, 2004, p. 272
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forward that dealt with the problem of how to set MFIs' interest rates since
some donor-ﬁnanced programs which set interest rates at very low levels had
to struggle with ﬁnancial viability when donations were interrupted. It has
been found out that the most important requirement for MFIs to maintain
long-term viability is to charge interest rates that are high enough to cover
all operational and ﬁnancial costs of MFIs59.
Three diﬀerent types of lending interest rates can be distinguished, namely
nominal, real and eﬀective interest rate. The nominal interest rate is nor-
mally charged to borrowers, while the real interest rate takes the inﬂation
into account. The real interest rate can be approximated as follows:
Real Interest Rate = Nominal Interest Rate - Rate of Inﬂation
A nominal interest rate larger than the rate of inﬂation indicates a positive
real interest rate, which is essential for the MFI to be able to maintain the
value of its loan fund. However, in the borrowers' perspective a positive
interest rate is a service in return for using the lenders' money.
According to Richard Rosenberg an eﬀective interest rate is the rate that
a borrower really pays, based on the amount of actual interest yield in the
borrower's hand during each period of the life of the loan. The formula for
calculating the eﬀective interest rate is:
Eﬀective Interest Rate60 = Total interest and fees
Average balance outstanding
x Periods in a year
Periods in the loan term
Through changing any of the following factors an increase in the eﬀective
interest rate as well as an increase in the MFIs' yield can be achieved.
59see http://depts.washington.edu/mﬁnance/ru/curriculum/docs/55_pricing.pdf,
availability date: May 20, 2008
60http://depts.washington.edu/mﬁnance/ru/curriculum/docs/55_pricing.pdf, avail-
ability date: May 20, 2008
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• Requiring payment of interest at the beginning of the loan, as a deduc-
tion from the amount of principal disbursed to the borrower.
• Requiring that a portion of the loan amount be deposited with the
lender as compulsory savings either prior or after the loan disbursement.
• Charging an initial comission or a fee in addition to the interest.
• More frequent payment of principal and interest, like quoting a monthly
interest rate but collecting principal and interest weekly.61
The amount of a microcredit interest rate that a borrower has to pay
depends on the quoted interest rate and on the applied calculation methode.
Two general calculation techniques are used, namely the declining balance
methode and the "ﬂat" methode. The diﬀerence between these two methodes
is due to the fact that the declining balance methode imposes lower costs on
the borrower as the "ﬂat" methode does. Furthermore, the declining balance
methode generates lower yield on a MFI's portfolio as as the "ﬂat" methode62.
The Consultative Groupe to Assist the Poor (CGAP) has designed a
methode which enables MFIs to determine appropriate interest rates that
ensure their ﬁnancial viability. The model presented by the CGAP is simpli-
ﬁed and therefore a little imprecise. However, the model provides an approx-
imation that should be of good use for many MFIs. The eﬀective interest
rate (R) required for ﬁnancial sustainability is made up of ﬁve elements:
• Administrative Expenses(AE)
- calculated by dividing total annual administrative expenses by the
average outstanding loan portfolio;
61see Occasional Paper No. 1, 2002, p. 5
62see http://depts.washington.edu/mﬁnance/ru/curriculum/docs/55_pricing.pdf,
availability date: May 20, 2008
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• Loan Loss Rate(LL)
- that is the annual loss due to uncollectible loans;
• The Cost of Funds (CF)
- is not the MFI's actual cash cost of funds but it is a projection of
the future "market" cost of funds as the MFIs' past dependence on
subsidized donor ﬁnance grows;
• The desired Capitalization Rate (K)
- represents the real net proﬁt that the MFI decides to target divided
by the average loan portfolio
• Investment Income Rate(II)
- income, expected from the MFI's ﬁnancial assets, divided by the
average loan portfolio63
In general, according to CGAP, an eﬃcient mature microﬁnance institu-
tion has administrative expenses between 10%-25%, loan loss rates between
1-2% and a capitalization rate of at least 5-15%. The formular for detecting
the minimum required annualized eﬀective interest rate is as follows:
R = AE+LL+CF+K−II
1−LL
63see CGAP Occasional Paper No. 1, 2002, p. 2
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7 Microﬁnance in Uganda
Financial markets in developing countries and particularly in the sub-Saharan
African (SSA) region are largely underdeveloped and dominated by a few,
often foreign-owned commercial banks. In fact, credit, savings and insurance
markets are generally non-existent in rural areas. Therefore, ﬁnancial services
which are adjusted on the requirements of the rural population are of great
importance64.
The signiﬁcance of rural credit services can be best understood by con-
sidering the importance of the agricultural sector on the economic system of
a developing country. In Uganda, it can be seen that agriculture forms the
most important sector of the economy. It employs over 80% of the work force
which accounts 30.2% of the gross domestic product (GDP)65.
According to the paper of Mr. Mpuga the agricultural potential of Uganda
cannot fully be exploited in consequence of limited rural credit services, poor
infrastructure, small land holdings and the land nature tenure system. In
addition, the agricultural sector receives only about 9% of the total commer-
cial bank credit annually. In contrast, wholesale and retail trade of general
merchandise, which contribute about 10% of GDP, receive more than 50%
of total commercial bank credit and manufacturing, which also contributes
about 10% of GDP, receives about 25% of commercial bank credit 66.
64see Mpuga, 2004, p. 2
65see https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html,
availability date: June 16, 2008
66see The Republic of Uganda, 2004, p. 2
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7.1 Financial Sector
Uganda's ﬁnancial system is highly dualistic since it consists of formal and in-
formal ﬁnancial markets. The formal ﬁnancial market is constituted by com-
mercial banks, development banks and credit institutions which are mainly
urban based. Therefore rural areas, home of the majority of poor people,
remain either under-banked or are served by informal ﬁnancial institutions.
Even though Uganda has a long history of informal ﬁnance, a more organised
microﬁnance industry did not develop until the early 1990s67. During the last
eight years of the 90ies, the industry had a per annum growth rate of about
70%. Since then MFIs have grown in terms of number of clients, size of their
portfolio and level of outreach. Currently over 500 MFIs are operating in
Uganda68.
The Centenary Rural Development Bank Ltd. (CERUDEB) represents
the largest single microlender in Uganda. It was established in the 1980s
on the initiative of the Ugandan National Council of Lay Apostate for pro-
moting the provision of appropriate ﬁnancial services to the rural population
of Uganda. In 1983 the Centenary Rural Development Trust was registered
as a ﬁnancial institution and in 1986 the institution started its operations.
Finally, in 1993 the Trust was transformed into a commercial bank. Today,
according to the MIX Market, CERUDEB serves over 550,000 Ugandan fam-
ilies, primarily in rural areas of the country. In addition, it counts 66,113
microborrowers and deals with a gross loan portfolio of over $117 million.69
In order to ensure the further growth of the microﬁnance sector, the Ugan-
dan parliament passed an Act in 2003 which established a new type of insti-
tution, called microﬁnance deposit-taking institution (MDI). The objective
67see Nannyonjo, 2004, p. 9
68see http://www.ugandainvest.com/Regulate.PDF, availability date: May 21, 2008
69see http://www.microﬁnancegateway.com, availability date: May, 5th, 2008
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of that act was to transform the larger unregulated microﬁnance institutions
into regulated ﬁnancial institutions. In October 2004 FINCA Uganda was
licensed as the ﬁrst MDI. Subsequently, the Uganda Finance Trust became a
licensed MDI in October 200570. According to the CGAP Focus Note No. 33
only four institutions have applied and qualiﬁed themselves for the program
so far. Those MFIs which are still unregulated will not be allowed to take
deposits from the public and are not recognized by the Association of the
Micro Finance Institutions of Uganda (AMFIU)71.
Most MFIs provide two categories of ﬁnancial products, namely credit and
savings, and call on their clients to repay their loans in weekly installments
consisting of principal and interest. This loan repayment structure is better
adapted to clients who are involved in trade than to clients who are involved
in agriculture. The reason for that is very simple: Since agricultural work
force do not produce regular income streams they have problems to ensure
weekly repayment capacities.
The most frequently applied lending methode in Uganda is group lending
in the form of a mixture of solidarity groups with traditional village bank-
ing. Many MFIs require their clients to deposit either compulsory savings or
Loan Insurance Funds or often seek a certain percentage of the loan. Thereby,
MFIs are trying to protect themselves against high risk borrowers. Subse-
quently these compulsory savings are "locked-in" and not made available to
the clients until they fully repay their micro loans72.
Recent surveys on MFIs in Uganda have established that MFIs have a
high concentration in the central region (33%) followed by the east (23%),
the southwest (19%), the north (14%) and the western region (11%). The
70see http://www.capacity.org, availabilty date: May, 5th, 2008
71see Nannyonjo, 2004, p. 18
72see Ledgerwood, 2002, p. 2
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Republic of Uganda traces back the high concentration of MFIs in the central
region by the high rate of economic activity there. The low concentration
of MFIs in the north and west regions is explained by the high crime rate
in some parts of these regions which has a negative eﬀect on the economy
in these areas. In addition, it has been observed that the number of people
provided with MFIs' ﬁnancial sevices is still very low. Only 0,9% of Uganda's
population utilize these services, which corresponds to 196,561 clients. This
percentage respresents about 2% of the population that is living below the
poverty line73.
7.2 Credit Rationing
Access to credit is of crucial importance from a consumption and an in-
vestment perspective, whereas the availability of credit from formal credit
sources is fairly constrained. Currently, 80% of the people in Uganda have
no access to formal ﬁnancial services74. Therefore, credit-constrained Ugan-
dans are forced to turn to the informal ﬁnancial sector, which is made up
of friends, relatives, community funds, co-operative credit societies, Non-
Government Organizations (NGOs), money lenders, commercial ﬁrms or gov-
ernment agencies75.
Let us take a closer look on credit rationing in the ﬁnancial banking
system of Uganda. According to the study of Okurut, Schoombee and Berg
credit is contrained, particularly that oﬀered by formal credit sources. The
dataset of the Uganda National Household survey 1999/2000 points out that
less than 10% of the grown up had applied for credit in the last twelve months
and fewer than 5% had applied for bank credits. These quotes are very
73see The Republic of Uganda, 2004, p. 34
74see Ledgerwood, 2002, p. 22
75see Okurut/Schoombee/Berg, 2004, p. 487
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characteristic for the situtation on the Ugandan formal banking sector. Both,
access to banks and the prevailing credit criteria of banks have eliminated
the formal banking sector as a potential source of credit for many borrowers.
This fact implies that there still exists a large unmet need for credit services.
Finally the survey showed, that 44% of the Ugandan people who did not
apply for bank credits stated that they did not really need such credits.
By analyzing Ungandan lenders' credit rationing behavior Okurut, Schombee
and Berg found out that socio-economic factors have a big inﬂuence on
whether credit is applied for, on the amount applied for, on the amount
of credit provided and credit rationed. They discovered that men are in a
better position than women when they apply for credit. Men's probability
of being credit rationed is reduced because they are seen as more creditwor-
thy since they possess control over household resources. In other words, a
gender discrimination against women is prevalent in Uganda. In addition,
asset values are decisive for the credit allocation since assets are a measure of
creditworthiness. This means that borrowers with more assets are less likely
to be credit rationed. Also age has a negative eﬀect on the credit rationing
probability since older persons are rated as more creditworthy than younger.
Furthermore, being an urban resident reduces the credit rationing probabil-
ity. The reason is the fact that urban households have a more diverse income
base compared to rural households. Finally, also borrowers' regional location
is decisive. That means, that potential borrowers from the northern region of
Uganda are more likely to be credit rationed than borrowers of other parts.
The only factor that lowers the probability of credit rationing in the urban
sector is land size. Land in urban areas has a higher value compared to land
in rural areas, which means that land in the urban area represents a good
collateral.
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In principle, credit supply is determined by the lenders' perception of
borrowers' creditworthiness, that is whether they are able to repay the loan
or not. The scarcity of credit is caused by the rationing of credit supply to
just over 56% by banks and informal lenders. Konwing that, it is surprising
that the majority of people who apply for credit indeed obtain credit. Figure
6 shows that in total only 11.4% are rationed in the informal sector and in
the formal sector only 19,1% are rationed.
Figure 6: Degree of Credit Rationing in Uganda
Source: Okurut/Schombee/Berg, 2004, p. 20
A possible reason why 74,5% of the people are not rationed may be the
fact that people from rural areas, who are unlikely to obtain credit, do not
apply. In other words, credit rationing takes place by self-selection through
the borrowers. Another explanation may be that almost everyone who seeks
credit is in fact able to obtain it, whereby risky borrowers may be credit
constrained through costs and conditions76.
7.2.1 Interest Rate Ceilings
During the ﬁnancial sector reform in the 1980s many developing countries
liberalized their interest rates. However, a number of developing countries
76see Okurut/Schombee/Berg, 2005, p. 21
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still maintained some sort of interest rate ceiling. Nowadays most of the
interest rate ceilings are not oriented speciﬁcally toward microﬁnance but
they still have a signiﬁcant impact on the microﬁnance sector when they are
set too low.
The fact, that in some countries a number of MFIs charge interest rates
higher than commercial and state banks have forced governments to consider
or impose interest rate ceilings77. In the case of Uganda the government
imposed an interest rate ceiling which the MFIs have to follow. According to
the Ugandan newspaper, New Vision Kampala, the interest rates are set at
or below inﬂation. Currently MFIs in Uganda lend at interest rates between
25 to 30 percent.
Despite good intentions, interest rate ceilings tend to reduce the supply of
microcredit since it complicates new MFIs' entry into the industry and makes
it diﬃcult for existing ones to stay in business as The Consultative Group
to Assist the Poor (CGAP) reports. Uganda's President, Yoweri Museveni,
criticized the "high interest rates" which MFIs charge and proposed that
government money should not be invested in MFIs with high interest rates.
In addition, he made clear that the aim of microﬁnance should be to advance
the productivity of the rural poor rather than generating proﬁt78.
"In 1999, the government of Uganda recognized microﬁnance "as a line
of business", reports the CGAP, with interest rates set at market levels. The
recognition followed the failure of its 1998 subsidized microloan scheme, En-
tendikwa, in which $193,000 was repaid out of loans totaling $5.1 million79".
77see CGAP Occasional Paper, 2004, p. 8
78http://microcapitalmonitor.com/cblog/index.php?/archives/322-Ugandan-President-
Attacks-High-Interest-Rates-of-Microﬁnance-Institutions.html, availability date: June 18,
2008
79Article Homepage, 2006
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7.2.2 Interest Rates and Competition
According to the Ugandan Ministry of Finance, the interest rates charged by
MFIs are relatively high, ranging between 22% - 48% per annum and 2% - 5%
per month. This is because MFIs must cover operational and ﬁnancial costs
in order to achieve the objectives of a sustainable and growing microﬁnance
industry. Also the fact that the industry faces a relatively high credit risk and
low levels of competition are responsible for high interest rates the borrowers
are charged with80.
However, according to the Association of Microﬁnance Institutions of
Uganda (AMFIU), nominal interest rates charged by the Ugandan MFIs
have declined a little in recent years, from about 5% a month prior to 2000
to around 3% a month currently. Moreover, some are shifting from a ﬂat rate
to a declining balance as a basis for charges. The reason for that trend may
be rooted in increasing scale, eﬃciency of and competition between MFIs.
The comparison of microﬁnance institution and commercial bank interest
rates between 1999 and 2004 shows that those of MFIs became about 10% less
expensive. Furthermore, all questioned MFIs are convinced that microcredit
rates will continuously go down over the next ﬁve years. They expect a
reduction in microcredit rates from an average eﬀective rate of around 50%
to below 40%. Some market participants even expected them to fall below
30%81.
In recent years the microﬁnance sector has become more competitive,
whereby the microcredit market of Uganda counts as one of the most com-
petitive in the world. It is growing very rapidly, contains a relatively large
number of small MFIs and there are still new ﬁrms entering the market. Ac-
80see The Republic of Uganda, 2004/5, p. 35
81see CGAP Focus Note 33, 2006, p. 6
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cording to Unganda's local MFIs, they pay close attention to each other's
actions and regularly assemble competitive information about each other's
product oﬀering. This course of action inﬂuences their product design and in
some cases their pricing decisions. Finally micro credit providers announced
that competition has intensiﬁed during the last three years and that the trend
is likely to be continued82.
82see CGAP Focus Note 33, 2006, p. 4
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8 Conclusion
Since Muhammad Yunus (Bangaldesh) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize,
for his eﬀorts to create economic and social development in developing coun-
tries in 2006, the microcredit movement came back into the main focus of
public interest.
Microﬁnance, which describes a combination of loans, investment oppor-
tunities, insurance options and other ﬁnancial services, is seen as a powerful
instrument of poverty reduction. It has been demonstrated, that microﬁ-
nance is an instrument of self empowerment which enables the poor to build
up enterprises and generate job opportunities. Already very small size loans,
often less than $100, are suﬃcient for helping the poor to work their own
way out of poverty. Especially women beneﬁt from microﬁnance loans since
it contributes to an improvement of women's roles in society when they are
responsible for loans and for managing savings.
Nevertheless, the question remains whether microﬁnance programs really
contribute to a lasting poverty reduction? And do they really lead to strong
and ﬂourishing local economies? The opinions of microﬁnance experts diﬀer.
Microcredit advocates see these programs as a solution to poverty reduction.
They argue that poor people are given the chance to generate their own in-
come by using borrowers' funds. Moreover, borrowers are able to build up
positive credit records which increases their loan sizes and enables them to
make bigger investments. Mainly the position of women is strengthened by
microﬁnance since they often get involved into commercial economic activi-
ties for the ﬁrst time. By giving them more control over household assets and
resources, they are enabled to set up businesses and allowed to earn money
in societies where they face religious and social barriers83.
83see Article Feiner, 2006
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However, critics believe that the microﬁnance industry has come to a
crossroad. They believe, in order to bring microﬁnance closer to its goal of
sustainability and poverty reduction on a massive scale, microﬁnance has to
lower its dependence on donor capital and intensify its access to the private
sector capital84.
At the moment, economic data about microﬁnance is hard to obtain, un-
reliable or little transparent. The MIX Market, which is a global microﬁnance
marketplace, is trying to make the microﬁnance sector more transparent by
collecting data and making them accessible. By advancing transparency, ac-
countability and increased disclosure standards, the MIX Market attempts
to attract more publicly and commercially oriented investors.
Up to now many achievements concerning the improvement of poor peo-
ples' lives have already been reached in developing countries with the help
of microﬁnance instruments. There are still idle capacities wich are waiting
to be exploited in the future. By learning how to deal with banking policy,
microﬁnance institutions probably will be able to develop to formal ﬁnancial
institutions, in other words banks.
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Appendix
A) Abstract
In this thesis I focus on the microﬁnance industry, which became an impor-
tant component of the development strategy worldwide. I investigate the
provision of low scale ﬁnancial services to low-income people in developing
countries, who had completely been excluded from the credit market until
recently. First of all, I give a brief overview of the beginnings and the current
situation of the microﬁnance sector in developed countries.
The main focus is on the modern microﬁnance movement which goes
back to the founder of the Grameen Bank (Bangladesh), Muhammad Yunus.
Diﬀerent lending techniques, such as individual and joint liability contracts,
will be discussed. In addition, possible extensions to microcredit contracts,
which could improve the quality of ﬁnancial services, will be shown.
The thesis is also concerned with several problems emerging on the ﬁnan-
cial market of developing countries. There credit markets have to deal with
market failures, such as imperfect information and transaction costs in the
lending process. These factors are responsible for the phenomena of credit
rationing and high interest rates.
Finally, the thesis shows how the theoretical models of microﬁnance can
be applied to developing countries, whereby the situation in Uganda serves as
an example. The most frequently applied lending methodes as well as diverse
problems in relation to Uganda's formal and informal ﬁnancial markets are
investigated.
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B) Kurzfassung
Diese Diplomarbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Mikroﬁnanzindustrie in den En-
twicklungsländern. Im speziellen wird das Angebot von ﬁnanzwirtschaftlichen
Dienstleistungen an einkommensschwache Haushalte sowie die daraus resul-
tierenden Probleme untersucht.
Zunächst wird ein kurzer Überblick über die europäischen Anfänge sowie
ein Einblick in die gegenwärtige Situation der Mikroﬁnanzindustrie in den
Industrieländern geben. In weiterer Folge wird das Hauptaugenmerk auf
die moderne Mikroﬁnanz-Bewegung gelegt, welche auf Muhammad Yunus
den Gründer der Grameen Bank (Bangladesh) zurückgeht. Hierbei wer-
den die von Mikroﬁnanzinstituten, an die Bedürfnisse einkommensschwacher
Haushalte angepassten ﬁnanzwirtschaftlichen Produkte und Dienstleistun-
gen untersucht. Zusätzlich werden mögliche Erweiterungen von Klein- und
Kleinstkrediten, sprich Versicherungen, diskutiert. In weiterer Folge werden
noch diverse Probleme der Mikroﬁnanzindustrie wie Kreditrationierung und
hohe Zinsen behandelt.
Abschließend, wird anhand des ugandischen Finanzmarktes gezeigt, in
wieweit die diversen Mikroﬁnanzprodukte und Methoden zur Anwendung
kommen.
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